Half Monk, Half Hitman: Applying Just War Theory to Private Military and Security Companies in the Context of Humanitarian Intervention by Peters, Robert J.
Florida Journal of International Law 
Volume 28 Issue 2 Article 2 
January 2016 
Half Monk, Half Hitman: Applying Just War Theory to Private 
Military and Security Companies in the Context of Humanitarian 
Intervention 
Robert J. Peters 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peters, Robert J. (2016) "Half Monk, Half Hitman: Applying Just War Theory to Private Military and 
Security Companies in the Context of Humanitarian Intervention," Florida Journal of International Law: 
Vol. 28 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol28/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
HALF MONK, HALF HITMAN: APPLYING JUST WAR
THEORY TO PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Robert 1 Peters*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ ..... 196
A. We Could Have Saved Lives ................ ...... 196
B. Overcoming Political Inaction ............... ..... 197
II. ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY COMPANIES ................................. 198
III. DISADVANTAGES AND CRITICISMS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY COMPANIES ....................................... 201
IV. LEGAL CONTEXT OF PMSCS............................204








G. Probability ofSuccess............... ...........214
H. Public Declaration ................................... 214
VI. INTEGRATING JUST WAR THEORY CRITERIA INTO PMSC
OPERATING GUIDELINES.................................... 214
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................... 216
* Robert J. Peters, J.D., is an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney in Hampshire County, West




Peters: Half Monk, Half Hitman: Applying Just War Theory to Private Milit
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
A. We Could Have Saved Lives
In only a hundred days, 800,000 men, women, and children were
slaughtered in the Rwandan genocide.' Future U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Samantha Power called it "the fastest, most efficient
killing spree of the twentieth century."2 A plane carrying Rwandan
President Habyarimana was shot down, sparking the violence.3
Though U.S. officials claimed ignorance of the full scope of the
atrocities, it was apparent the morning after the plane crash that the
minority Tutsi ethnic group was being systematically targeted.4 In 2004,
classified documents were released showing the administration's
knowledge of a "final solution to eliminate all Tutsis" "well in advance
of the genocide."5 Regardless, the Clinton Administration ordered its
spokesmen "not to describe the deaths there as genocide," since it "could
inflame public calls for action the Administration is unwilling to take."
6
Officials shunned "the g-word" to avoid incurring obligations under the
Genocide Convention, as well as to avoid harming U.S credibility by
acknowledging and then ignoring the crimes.7
The United States opposed requests by U.N. General Romeo Dallaire
for reinforcements; the rationale was that inciting an engagement with
foreign troops "would end as a large and costly [engagement] by
Americans."8 This fear had its roots in Somalia, where U.S. troops were
killed while attempting to aid Pakistanis.9 As a result the United States
supported removing the entire U.N. peacekeeping force, in order to
prevent future U.S. involvement. 10
Even when genocide was manifest, "when bodies were shown
choking the Kagera River on the nightly news," U.S. policy was only
influenced "in a negative way."" Once Americans were evacuated,
1. Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC, Sept. 1, 2001, at 84.
2. Id.
3. Jon Rosen, The President's Assassins, SLATE MAG. (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.slate.
corn/articles/newsandpolitics/roads/2014/04/rwandangenocide_20thanniversarytouringju
v_nalhabyarimanascrash site.html (last accessed Feb. 21, 2015).
4. Power, supra note 1, at 86.
5. Bill Clinton: We Could Have Saved 300,000 Lives in Rwanda (Mar. 13, 2013), CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100546207# (last accessed Feb. 21, 2015); Rory Carroll, US Chose to
Ignore Rwandan Genocide, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2004, at 14.
6. Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings "Genocide," N.Y.
TIES, June 10, 1994, at A.8.
7. Power, supra note 1, at 96.
8. Id. at 98.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 96.
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Rwanda "largely dropped off the radar" of the Clinton Administration.12
Documents released in 2014 from the Clinton library show the
administration's sensitivity to the suggestion that Somalia played a role
in the U.S. response to Rwanda.13 A memorandum suggested that the
Clinton administration believed that the United States "did the right
thing," "put Somalia behind us and moved into Rwanda in full force."' 4
Years later, however, Clinton expressed regret, stating that if the United
States had intervened, "we could have saved" 300,000 lives.'s Clinton
said that this failure to act informed the creation of the Clinton
Foundation. 16
B. Overcoming Political Inaction
In recent decades, several humanitarian crises arose that could not
have been stopped without the use of force. Rwanda is a sober reminder
that sometimes, regardless of the lives at risk, politics trumps all. In
Rwanda, this took the form of concerns of political capital. Future U.S.
Ambassador Power credited "risk averse policy choices" as contributing
to the U.S. failure to intervene.'7 Perceived disapproval by the American
people is another possible factor.18 Political inaction could also be
interpreted as a failure of the public at large; perhaps if the broader public
were more educated and vocal about the Rwandan genocide, it could have
exerted meaningful political pressure. The reality is that "all possible
sources" of political pressure: "U.S. allies, Congress, editorial boards,
and the American people-were mute when it mattered for Rwanda."19
Michael Sheehan, Peacekeeping Advisor to then-Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, recalls that "there was no one within the United
States political spectrum in that period ... There was almost a silence on
that issue at the time."20
Private military and security companies2' are certainly not a panacea
for international human rights issues, and as we will discuss, in some
instances they have been the perpetrators of abuse. However, a lack of
12. Id. at 97.
13. Dana Hughes, Bill Clinton Regrets Rwanda Now (Not So Much In 1994), ABC NEWS
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/02/bill-clinton-regrets-rwanda-now-
not-so-much-in-1994/ (last accessed Feb. 21, 2015).
14. Id.
15. CNBC, supra note 5.
16. Id.
17. Power, supra note 1, at 86.
18. See supra Part 1; Power, supra note 1, at 104.
19. Power, supra note 1, at 104.
20. Ghosts of Rwanda: America's Response to the Genocide, PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 1,
2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/ghosts/themes/response.html.
21. Hereinafter referred to as "PMSCs."
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political will on the part of nation-states to intervene in cases of genocide
and gross violations of human rights could possibly be mitigated through
delegation to private actors, for a variety of reasons that this article will
explore. It is unlikely that the mere option of a PMSC would have
changed the outcome in Rwanda, since the Pentagon rejected
substantially less objectionable tactics, such as jamming radio signals to
frustrate the systematic killing. One PMSC actually did consider
"contracting with the United Nations" to stop the genocide in Rwanda.2 2
This of course did not happen.
Likewise, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether
usage of PMSCs would have been effective in other instances of
genocide.23 However, the PMSC may be an effective tool in future crises
where political will is in question, particularly in the context of
humanitarian intervention.
In Part II, this Article will discuss potential benefits of private military
companies. Part III will address and acknowledge criticisms of PMSCs.
Part IV provides a brief legal context, and Part V will discuss the just war
theory criteria relevant to PMSCs in the context of humanitarian
intervention. This section will examine why PMSC humanitarian
intervention may be permissible in certain circumstances. The PMSC
Executive Outcomes will serve as a dual case study; on the one hand, it
would have been authorized by just war theory to contract with the United
Nations to intervene in Rwanda. However, Executive Outcomes also
considered contracting with the Hutu government, the perpetrators of the
genocide, which would be a gross violation of just war theory.2 4 Part VI
will argue for the express integration of just war criteria into PMSC
operating guidelines; this is crucial for the moral, political, and perhaps
legal legitimacy of PMSC actors.
II. ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES
There are political advantages to PMSCs. The public will typically
oppose "putting 'the troops' in harm's way" for a humanitarian
intervention, but PMSC usage is unlikely to generate such controversy.
2 5
This is a particularly crucial advantage given the political inertia
22. Adam Ebrahim, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United States,
International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 181, 216 (2010) (citing
P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 185
(Robert J. Art, et al. eds., Cornell Univ. Press 2008) (2003)).
23. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
(2002) (discussing the U.S. role in 20th century genocide).
24. Ebrahim, supra note 22, at 216 n.246.
25. Id. at 216.
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surrounding Rwanda. One critic of privatization characterized PMSC
usage as being not about saving money, but "avoiding tough political
choices";2 6 though perhaps morally objectionable, this does highlight a
tactical advantage in the context of humanitarian intervention. Besides, if
nation-states are "unwilling or unable to act in the worst conflict-driven
humanitarian crises in a decade (Rwanda and Darfur), the use of [PMSCs]
should be at least contemplated."2 7 Furthermore, PMSCs can be an
indispensable method for states to defend against atrocities by insurgent
troops; Nigeria has used "hundreds of mercenaries from South Africa" in
a "decisive role" against the Islamic militant group Boko Haram, which
has been responsible for horrific atrocities in the region.2 8
PMSCs are capable of humanitarian intervention "at a lower cost than
the public sector."29 PMSC Executive Outcomes estimated that a "wholly
privatized six-month intervention" at the beginning of the Rwandan
genocide would cost $600,000 daily.3 0 In contrast, the U.N. intervention
ultimately cost about $3 million per day, and was too late to stop the
genocide.3 1 Additional cost savings accrue following hostilities, when
contractors are no longer necessary.3 2
This is not to suggest hat privatization is necessarily a cost-saver; for
example, private contractors in charge of "enhanced" interrogations cost
"about double the salary of a Federal employee."33 Additionally, the non-
competitive structure of government contracts often increases the cost of
outsourcing military functions.34 Peter Singer claims the idea that
"outsourcing saves money" is "a common myth." 3 5
PMSCs offer a great deal of flexibility, and can be contracted for
smaller personal security services, broader intervention, or as a response
to international piracy.3 6 Congressman Ron Paul proposed that Congress
"issue letters of marque and reprisal" to PMSCs to address Somalian
26. P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004,
at B3.
27. Oldrich Bures, Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?, 12
INT'L PEACEKEEPING 533, 543 (2005).
28. Adam Nossiter, Mercenaries Join Nigeria's Military Campaign Against Boko Haram,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www. nytimes.com/2015/03/13/world/africa/nigerias-fight-
against-boko-haram-gets-help-from-south-african-mercenaries.html? r-2.
29. Ebrahim, supra note 22, at 216.
30. Id. (citing SINGER, supra note 22, at 185-86).
31. Id.
32. Theodore T. Richard, Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing Private Security
Providers Against Piracy, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 411, 414 (2010).
33. Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance ofBusiness Activities
in Conflict Zones, 11 CH. J. INT'L L. 321, 338 (2011).
34. DAVID ISENBERG, PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND U.S. GRAND STRATEGY 23
(Int'l Peace Research Inst., Oslo (PRIO) ed., 2009).
35. Singer, supra note 26, at B3.
36. Richard, supra note 32, at 413.
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pirates.37 This was intended to "avoid increasing the size" of the Navy,
which Paul perceived "as unable to suppress piracy without being 'nearly
omnipresent on the seas."'38 There is flexibility even in deployment: in
Somalia, PMSCs could defend individual ships at owner's expense, hunt
down pirates for payment, or assume a patrolling or policing capacity.3 9
Quality is another advantage; PMSCs "can handpick from a pool of
proven combat veterans."40  Widespread usage of PMSCs by
corporations, governments, non-governmental organizations, and even
the United Nations itself, indicates the ability of PMSCs to effectively
perform humanitarian intervention.4 1
Private actors also avoid the bureaucratic burdens faced by the public
sector,4 2 such as civil service rules and unionized workforce constraints.4
Though lack of accountability is a frequent criticism of PMSCs, in some
circumstances private security "has been celebrated as more accountable
than its public counterpart,' since private security must "answer to the
discipline of the market," and there are a variety of accountability
problems in public police forces.4 6 There are related philosophical
arguments in favor of private actors.46 One scholar suggests that given
existing domestic problems, accountability under international law can
be actually be maintained and increased through privatization.4 7
37. Id. at 413-14.
38. Id. at 414 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ron Paul, Responses to Piracy,
CAMPAIGN FOR LIBERTY (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?
view-58).
39. Richard, supra note 32, at 415 (citing Rajesh Joshi, Why the Time Has Come to Arm
Crews, LLOYD'S LIST 5 (Mar. 27, 2009), available at http:// www.Iloydslist.com/ll/epaper/ll/
contents. htm?issueNo=59891; Brooke A. Bornick, Comment, Bounty Hunters and Pirates:
Filling in the Gaps of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 259,
260-61 (2005).
40. Herbert Howe, Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive
Outcomes, 36 J. MOD. AFR. STUDS. 307, 309 (1998).
41. Oldrich Bures, Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?, 12
INT'L PEACEKEEPING 533, 543-44 (2005), available at http://www.academiaedu/6169589/
Private militarycompaniesA second bestpeacekeepingoption (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
42. Richard, supra note 32, at 414 (citing Claude Berube, Blackwaters for the Blue Waters:
The Promise of Private Naval Companies, 51 ORBIS 601, 611 (2007); David A. Sklansky, The
Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1189 (1998); David A. Wallace, The Future Use of
Corporate Warriors with the US. Armed Forces: Legal, Policy, and Practical Considerations
and Concerns, 51 DEF. ACQUISITION REV. J. 123, 129 (2009).
43. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165, 1189 (1998).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. "[T]he production of security should not be removed from the jurisdiction of free
competition; and if it is removed, society as a whole suffers a loss." Gustave de Molinari, Security
an Exception?, THE PRODUCTION OF SECURITY (2006), http://mises.org/library/production-
security#4 (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
47. Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
[Vol. 28200
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PMSCs may be a more attractive option for assembling international
coalitions, since some nations "are more inclined to provide funding"
than actual forces.4 8 It is conceivable that PMSCs could reduce blowback
in areas where the United States does not have a visible military presence.
For example, if humanitarian intervention is necessary in a hostile area,
accomplishing it without U.S. troops could frustrate (or at least not
encourage) terrorist recruitment.
III. DISADVANTAGES AND CRITICISMS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY COMPANIES
PMSCs have limitations; they cannot independently "nation-build" or
solve deep-rooted societal problems, and are best used to accomplish
military objectives "ideally accompanied by a wider political and
humanitarian effort." 4 9 Thus a larger state or NGO-engineered initiative
would be ideal, with the PMSC focusing on the force and stabilization
aspects of the effort.o
There is a potential for abusive actions by PMSC personnel. This was
illustrated by the Abu Ghraib atrocities, in which "more than a third of
the improper incidents involved contractor personnel."5 ' This raised the
question of whether intelligence in general, and interrogation in
particular, "is an inherently governmental function."5 2 While the
contractor conduct is inexcusable, soldiers also perpetrated abuse, and
military leadership failed to properly supervise the Abu Ghraib prison.53
Contractor abuse is not limited to Abu Ghraib; Blackwater personnel
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 135, 141-45
(2005).
48. Richard, supra note 32, at 415 (citing Jian Chen, Foreign Assistance "More Plausible"
to Combat Somali Pirates: MOFA, Taiwan News, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.etaiwannews.com/
etn/newscontent.php?id=838250&lang=engnews).
49. Krzysztof Kotarski & Samuel Walker, Privatizing Humanitarian Intervention?
Mercenaries, PMCs and the Business ofPeace, in 7 Jus GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
ON LAW AND JUSTICE 239, 267 (R. Provost & P. Akhavan, eds., 2011).
50. Id.
51. Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised
Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549, 555
(2005).
52. Id.
53. See generally George Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Graib Detention Facility
and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 52 (2004), http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/dod/
fay82504rpt.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
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killed 17 Iraqi civilians in 2007,54 and were sentenced in 2015.ss
Beyond the abusive actions themselves, Abu Ghraib demonstrated the
problem of "insufficient contractor oversight."56 According the Fay
Report, up to 35% of contractors "lacked formal military interrogation
training,"57 but it must be remembered that the same training issues
plagued military personnel.s CACI International, the PMSC which
provided over half of the interrogators at Abu Ghraib, also failed to
"conduct adequate background investigations" prior to hiring the
contractors.59 Contract administrators at Abu Ghraib did "well to keep up
with the paperwork, and simply have no time to actively monitor
contractor performance."60 This problem evidenced a broader inability of
the U.S. government to properly manage its contracts in Iraq.6' Even
broader mismanagement of government contractors led one scholar to ask
whether procurement policy constitutes "responsible delegation or
abdication of responsibility?"62 There is no shortage of similar critiques
of PMSCs, from accountability shortcomings to normative democratic
concerns.63
Valid and serious concerns of accountability arise in the context of
sex trafficking and abuse by military and PMSC personnel.64 In Bosnia,
54. David Johnston & John Broder, FBI Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, N.Y.
TIMEs (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l 1/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.
html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). The FBI found that "at least 14 of the
shootings were unjustified and violated deadly-force rules in effect for security contractors in
Iraq." Id.
55. Wesley Bruer & Michael Pearson, Ex-Blackwater Contractors Sentenced in Nusoor
Square Shooting in Iraq, CNN, (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/13/us/blackwater-
contractors-iraq-sentencing/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
56. Schooner, supra note 51, at 556 (citing George Fay, supra note 53, at 49).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 556-57.
60. Fay, supra note 53, at 52.
61. Schooner, supra note 51, at 558.
62. Id. at 570.
63. See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern Warfare:
Sovereign Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. REv. 429
(2008); Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence ofA New Dog of War: Private International Security
Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75 (1998)
(acknowledging the effectiveness of private actors in swift tactical solutions, but viewing this as
problematic); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989, 1026 (2005); Ryan M.
Scoville, Toward an Accountability-Based Definition of "Mercenary," 37 GEo. J. INT'L L. 541
(2006); Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic
Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1003 (2004).
64. Margaret Maffai, Accountability for Private Military and Security Company
Employees That Engage in Sex Trafficking and Related Abuses While Under Contract with the
United States Overseas, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1095 (2009).
[Vol. 28202
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PMSC DynCorp "was implicated in a sex-slave scandal, but none of its
employees has been put on trial, and the company later fired the whistle-
blowers."65 Trafficking and exploitation "flourish in situations with weak
law enforcement," and "the demand for prostitution . . . increases with
the presence of military troops" and other "international personnel" with
access to income, such as PMSC contractors.6 6 Thus humanitarian
intervention by PMSC personnel inherently poses a great risk to the
vulnerable population that the personnel are ostensibly there to protect.
Even outside the context of humanitarian intervention, issues of PMSC
accountability may have grave humanitarian effects,67 and existing
domestic and international law is inadequate to oversee and punish
perpetrating PMSC employees.68
PMSCs choose their employers, and do not always do so morally,
working for "rebel groups, drug cartels, and before 9/11, two al Qaeda-
linked jihadist groups."69 This Article seeks to partially address this
wrong by urging the PMSCs to limit operations to jus ad bellum
frameworks.7 0
Perception of PMSCs can certainly be a disadvantage, given the
"historical prejudices against the private use of force" and "the almost
visceral distaste for mercenaries" that affects modern PMSCs.7 '
However, PMSCs should be judged on "what they actually do," not on
what they may do.72 If PMSCs were successfully used to prevent
genocide or used for other humanitarian purposes, then the "historical
disdain" for private force is inapt.73
While proper safeguards could be developed to alleviate concerns and
criticisms of PMSCs, there is certainly merit in the suggestion that these
should be developed prior to PMSC deployment.7 4 Accountability,
transparency, quality assurance, vetting of personnel, and express
65. James Pattison, Just War Theory and the Privatization ofMilitary Force, 22 ETHICS &
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 143, 152, 161 n.26 (2008) (citing Oldrich Bures, Private Military
Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?, 12 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 541-42 (2005)).
66. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No.
11057, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 166 (2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/21555.pdf
67. Maffai, supra note 64, at 1097-98 n.10.
68. Id. at 1099.
69. James Pattison, Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military Force, 22 ETHICS &
INT'L AFF. 143, 151, 161 n.21 (2008) (quoting Schreier & Caparini, Privatising Security at 68).
70. See infra Parts V and VI.
71. Krzysztof Kotarski & Samuel Walker, Privatizing Humanitarian Intervention?
Mercenaries, PMCs and the Business ofPeace, in 7 1Us GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
ON LAW AND JUSTICE 239, 267 (R. Provost & P. Akhavan eds., 2011).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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acknowledgment of legal jurisdiction over PMSC personnel are
essential.
IV. LEGAL CONTEXT OF PMSCs
A comprehensive treatment of relevant positive law is beyond the
scope of this Article. PMSCs present unique legal and political issues,
and their reappearance as a global phenomenon has changed the nature
of warfare in recent decades.76 According to one scholar, "there are no
specific legal instruments concerning PMCs."7 7 Indeed, concerns over
legal accountability and a perceived gap in the law has led the United
Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries to advocate for an
international treaty ensuring effective monitoring of abuses and means of
compensation for victims." Under this view, the OAU Convention for
the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, Article 47 of Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and the U.N. International
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries "do not clearly apply to PMCs," rendering their status
legally ambiguous.79
This view has a significant assumption: that PMSCs are distinct, for
definitional and legal purposes, from mercenaries. It is crucial for the
viability of PMSCs to maintain this distinction, from a positivist
standpoint if not from a realist or historical perspective. The central
argument of this article, that PMSCs should adoptjus ad bellum as well
as jus in bello norms within their operating guidelines, therefore has a
pragmatic appeal to PMSCs. Explicitly utilizing jus ad bellum criteria to
screen contracts, accepting only those which comport with just war
75. Id. at 543-44.
76. Kathy Gilsinan, How Mercenaries Are Changing Warfare, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/03/how-mercenaries-are-changing-warfare/1 08436/
(last accessed Apr. 21, 2015).
77. Pattison, supra note 69, at 151, 161 (citing SARAH PERCY, REGULATING THE PRIVATE
SECURITY INDUSTRY 41-44 (N.Y. ed. 2006)). But see Montreux Document on Pertinent
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private
Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict (2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf
78. Blackwater Sentencing -UN Experts on Mercenaries Callfor International Regulation
of Private Security, U.N. HUM. RTS., Display News (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=1 5840&LanglD=E.
79. Pattison, supra note 69, at 151-52. One such ambiguity is whether PMSC contractors
constitute "combatants," entitling them to "prisoner-of-war status under Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention." Id. at 152. According to the Montreux Document, which is not legally
binding, "the status of PMSC personnel in armed conflicts is determined on a case-by-case basis
... the status of PMSC personnel depends on the contract under which they are employed and on
the services they provide." Montreux, supra note 77, at 36.
[Vol. 28204
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theory, would distinguish PMSCs in a significant way from mercenaries,
who in the traditional conception only fight for money, and may be
bought by the highest bidder. It also takes PMSCs one step farther from
the positive law prohibitions on mercenaries, which, if enforced, could
cripple the industry.o
V. JUST WAR THEORY AND PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The criteria comprising just war theory can be divided into two
categories: jus ad bellum,81 or the "justifiability of going to war," and jus
in bello,82 "the justice of the means for fighting in war." 83 Many PMSC
protocols discussjus in bello, but as Part VI will discussjus ad bellum is
a crucial (and frequently absent) framework in determining the legitimate
use of force. It is beyond the scope of this article to comprehensively
defend humanitarian intervention by PMSCs as acceptable under just war
theory; rather, the purpose is to briefly discuss a few relevant classical
and contemporary positions in this context. This cursory examination
concludes that in some circumstances, PMSC intervention may be
permissible; that is, it is plausible that PMSCs could comply with just war
theory in the context of humanitarian intervention.
Jus in bello has two84 key elements: noncombatant discrimination and
proportionality of means. The principle of noncombatant discrimination
is straightforward: military personnel are to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants; targeting of civilians, or using civilians
as "human shields" is prohibited. Proportionality of means requires
"highly contextualized judgments ... that fit the value and difficulty of
securing or defeating a particular target, and no more."86 This principle
reflects both the importance of minimizing collateral damage and the
inherent dignity existing even within an enemy.
Jus ad bellum is composed of eight88 criteria: just cause, legitimate
authority, right intention, end of peace, last resort, proportionality of
80. See generally International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
(2013), http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/briefing4_webfinal.pdf (defining
mercenary and excerpting from statutes criminalizing mercenary behavior).
81. GARY M. SIMPsoN, WAR, PEACE, AND GOD: RETHINKING THE JUST-WAR TRADITION 27-
28 (2007) (emphasis added Latin phrase for "justice to war.").
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. "While there is no official, single index of criteria" for just war theory, this article will
proceed under the criteria quantity and phrasing from the Simpson book. Id
85. Id.
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ends, probability of success, and public declaration. I will discuss the jus
ad bellum criteria individually within the context of private humanitarian
intervention, such as through a PMSC. These criteria deserve a fuller
treatment than that given jus in bello since, as Part VI suggests, jus in
bello criteria have already been officially integrated to some extent into
PMSC protocols. Jus ad bellum provides a moral framework to determine
when war is morally defensible. Given the historical, political, and moral
complexity facing private actors in modem crises, this framework is
timely, relevant, and indispensable.
A. Just Cause
The criteria of just cause was implicitly recognized as far back as
Cicero, who asserted the existence of a "natural right to repel force by
force." 89 Just cause typically requires the perpetration of a real injury. 90
For example, St. Augustine condemned waging war for religious
purposes, such as to create the "city of God" on earth.91 Hugo Grotius,
the father of international law, grounded the constraint of unjust violence
within our common humanity: "a blood relationship has been established
among us by nature; consequently it is wrong for a man to set a snare for
a fellow man."92 Grotius affirmed the requirement of just cause to do
violence, and extended it to the context of war:
On the contrary war ought not to be undertaken except for the
enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be carried
on only within the bounds of law and good faith. Demosthenes
well said that war is directed against those who cannot be held in
check by judicial processes.9 3
While Grotius' ideas now have mainstream acceptance (and indeed
form the basis of our modem international system), they were
revolutionary for their time. The perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide
committed innumerable violations of human rights, to the extent that the
United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
to prosecute the violations.94 In Grotius's terms, humanitarian
89. Id at 40.
90. Id.
91. Id. Unfortunately Augustine was not consistent in this position, and laid the intellectual
foundation for religious wars in the coming centuries.
92. Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace, in ARTHUR F. HOLMES, WAR
AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS ON THE MORALITY OF WAR 231
(2d ed. 2005).
93. Id. at 234.
94. See U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
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intervention in Rwanda would be "for the enforcement of rights," and
"directed against" thousands of genocidal perpetrators who could not "be
held in check by judicial processes," due to the complicity of the state.95
Grotius' view is echoed by earlier and contemporary classical writers.
For example, Grotius approved of St. Augustine's definition of just wars
as those "which are made to avenge injuries,"96 and insisted that just
cause required "an injury, by which [he] meant a wrong or a violation of
rights."97 Francisco de Vitoria observed that a ruler does not have greater
authority over foreigners than his own citizens, "but he may not draw the
sword against his own subjects unless they have done some wrong."98
From this, Vitoria reasoned that rulers may not commit unprovoked
violence against the citizens of other kingdoms: "we may not use the
sword against those who have not harmed us; to kill the innocent is
prohibited by natural law." 99 Vitoria famously supported the Spaniards'
use of force in the New World "if necessary to protect the rights of new
converts there to remain Christian,"loo or to prevent human sacrifices.0'
Emmerich de Vattel had a similar requirement.102 Rwanda would also
meet Thomas Aquinas's requirement "that those who are to be warred
upon should deserve to be warred upon because of some fault."'03
Contemporary just war theory, while largely limiting just cause to
"defense against aggression," allows for "the possible exception of the
prevention of large-scale violations of human rights, such as
genocide."104 Humanitarian intervention has been comprehensively
95. Grotius, supra note 92.
96. JeffMcMahan, Just Causefor War, 19 ETMics&INT'LAFF. 1, 8, n.12 (2005) (quoting
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 76 (A.C. Campbell, A.M. ed., 1901)). Grotius
characterized St. Augustine as having "taken the word avenge in a general sense of removing and
preventing, as well as punishing aggressions." Id.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id at 9 (quoting Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 303-
04 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds., 1991).
99. Id at 9.
100. DAVIS BROWN, THE SWORD, THE CROSS, AND THE EAGLE: THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN
JUST WAR TRADITION 171 (2008) (citing FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE LURE BELLI
RELECTIONES ed., Ernest Nys iii, 13 (1917)).
101. Id. (citing FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE LURE BELLI RELECTIONEs ed., Ernest
Nys iii, 15 (1917)).
102. Emmerich de Vattel believed "the foundation, or cause of every just war is injury, either
already done or threatened." McMahan, supra note 96, at 8 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE
LAW OF NATIONS 302 (Joseph Chitty trans., Philadelphia: Johnson & Co. 6th ed. 1844) (1758).
103. Jonathan Barnes, The Just War, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER MEDIEVAL
PHILOSOPHY 777 (Norman Kretzmann et al. eds., 1982) (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, q. 40, art. 2).
104. One scholar limits the just causes of war to "the prevention or correction of wrongs that
are serious enough to make the perpetrators liable to be killed or maimed." McMahan, supra note
96, at 11. Perhaps in contrast, classical just war theorists "typically offer a short list ofjust causes
for war, [including] defense against unjust threats; recovery of or indemnity for what has been
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defended as consistent with just war theory, historicity, and natural
law.05 Jeff McMahan believes "military intervention by third parties may
also be justified on behalf of the victims."1 06 For McMahan, an important
requirement is that the intervention is requested, "or there must at least
be compelling evidence that the intended beneficiaries would welcome
rather than oppose intervention by the particular intervening agent or
agents."'07 In Rwanda, the requests for international help were frequent-
yet mostly ignored. McMahan concludes that other objections to
humanitarian intervention fail to show "that certain aims of humanitarian
intervention cannot be just causes for war."108 Therefore, if the PMSC
Executive Outcomes intervened in Rwanda, they would have acted in
accordance with the just cause criterion under classical just war theory as
well as contemporary scholarship.109 However, if they assisted the
Rwandan government in the genocide, they would obviously have lacked
such a just cause.
B. Legitimate Authority
The criterion of legitimate authority poses a greater challenge to
wrongfully taken, or compensation for the violation of rights; and punishment of wrongdoing, not
solely for the purpose of retribution but to prevent or deter further wrongful action by the culprit
or by others." Id.
105. See generally Jason Daniel Medinger, The Holy See, Historicity, and Humanitarian
Intervention: Using Integrative Jurisprudence to Inform Contemporary Practice, 41 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 39 (2006).
106. McMahan, supra note 96, at 13.
107. Id. McMahan believes this illustrates how the American invasion of Iraq contradicted
just war theory:
there was no evidence that ordinary Iraqis wanted to be freed from the Ba'athist
dictatorship by the United States-a country that a little more than a decade
earlier, and under the leadership of the current president's father, had bombed
their capital, decimated their civilian infrastructure, and successfully pressed for
the institution and perpetuation of sanctions that subsequently resulted in many
thousands of deaths among civilians.
Id.
108. McMahan, supra note 96, at 13-14.
109. Adam Ebrahim, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United States,
International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 181, 216 (2010).
Certainly many just war theorists would be opposed to such an intervention, but the thrust of the
disagreement would more accurately be focused on other criteria, such as legitimate authority or
right intention; in other words, they may disagree that the intervening PMSC possessed the right
to intervene, or that the injury is not the PMSC's to avenge; the disagreement is not over the
existence of the wrong itself, but who was wronged, and who has the right and authority to avenge
the wrong. For example, Emmerich de Vattel argued that "to determine what is to be considered
as an injury, we must be acquainted with a nation's rights . .. Whatever strikes at these rights is
an injury, and ajust cause of war." VATTEL, supra note 101, at 302.
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reconciling PMSC humanitarian intervention with just war theory. For
example, Aquinas explicitly required the authority of a sovereign to
declare a just war, responding to the "proliferation of war instigated by
wealthy private individuals" contracting with medieval PMSCs.1 10 St.
Augustine insisted that "the power to counsel and declare war belongs to
those who hold the supreme authority,""' which led to the modern
understanding that ideally, "war can be authorized only by . . . states
themselves or by international institutions, such as the U.N. Security
Council."l 12
While thorough consideration of the legitimate authority challenge is
not possible here, a few considerations are warranted. First, the historical
context for Aquinas and St. Augustine differs in relevant ways from
modernity: the state-based international system was nonexistent. Aquinas
could not have anticipated the multiplicity of private actors currently
employed by hundreds of nation-states and non-governmental
organizations for security and military purposes. Second, if the PMSC
contracts directly with a state, then it acts under the legal authority of that
state, and solely within the contractual parameters. It thus acts solely
through that state's authority, and if the state is exercising legitimate
authority, it is difficult to see how that legitimate authority becomes
inherently diluted by the PMSC. If the contract itself dilutes legitimate
authority, then this extends equally to standing armies, given the
contractual relationship between governments and non-PMSC military
contractors, to say nothing of troop reimbursement. There are certainly
important normative problems posed by PMSC usage,11 3 but these seem
inapposite to the legitimate authority criterion when the state directly
contracts with the PMSC. All of this assumes that non-governmental
organizations or private citizens can never constitute legitimate authority,
an assertion belied by United Nations practice, 14 its public condemnation
of mercenaries notwithstanding."' Additionally, some classical
perspectives allowed for the defense of others by third parties; although
110. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 48.
111. James Pattison, Just War Theory and the Privatization ofMilitary Force, 22 ETHiCS &
INT'L AFF. 143, 150 (2008) (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, VOL. 35,
Consequences of Charity 83, trans. Thomas Heath (1972)).
112. Id. at 150.
113. See generally supra Part III.
114. See Lou PINGEOT, DANGEROUS PARTNERSHIP: PRIVATE MILITARY & SECURITY
COMPANIES AND THE UN (2012), https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF Dangerous
PartnershipFull report.pdf (last accessed Apr. 20, 2015) (discussing the use of private military
and security companies).
115. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
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Grotius believed the sole just cause for war was self-defense,"6 he wrote
"If . .. it should be granted that even in extreme need subjects cannot
justifiably take up arms . . . , nevertheless it will not follow that others
may not take up arms on their behalf."" 7
McMahan deconstructs an additional and frequent objection to
humanitarian intervention in this context - that sovereignty and "national
self-determination" forbid it:
This objection is specious, however, when the intervention is
desired by the victims of governmental persecution. For in such
cases the gulf between victims and perpetrators is typically so wide
that there is no longer (if there ever was) a single collective "self'
whose autonomy is threatened, but rather two or more distinct
collective selves, one of which is engaged in wrongful action that
is not protected by its right of self-determination."8
McMahan's position looks beyond the legal fiction.of a homogenous
entity given its obvious demise when the "homogenous entity" is
slaughtering its own people, thus violating the key responsibility of
governments to protect their citizens. How could one argue that the
Tutsis' right to self-determination would be violated solely if a PMSC
prevented their systematic annihilation?
The very criterion of legitimate authority has received criticisms, with
one scholar concluding that "it may be questioned whether being
authorized by a legitimate authority is a necessary condition of the justice
of a war."I 19 This skepticism flowed from the political illegitimacy of
Security Council members, as well as the "morally justifiable" NATO
intervention in Kosovo "which lacked Security Council authorization but
was widely held to be morally justifiable." 20 The same scholar conceded,
however, that legitimate authority "has some moral significance,"l21 and
explored how PMSCs challenge two central rationales of the criterion:
the "regulation of warfare," and "democratic control over the use of
force."l22
116. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 48 (emphasis added).
117. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis ii, 25, 8, 3, as cited in DAVIS BROWN, THE SWORD, THE
CROSS, AND THE EAGLE: THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN JUST WAR TRADITION 256, n.31 (2008).
118. McMahan, supra note 96, at 13 (citing Jeff McMahan, Intervention and Collective Self-
Determination, 10 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 1 (1996)).
119. Pattison, supra note 65, at 150.
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 150-53.
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The sole acceptable intention is "the desire to restore a peace that is
better than the precipitating situation of aggression."l24 The right
intention criterion is grounded in a rich tradition of moral imperatives.
Bishop Ambrose was a "bridge figure between Cicero and [St.]
Augustine," and introduced the latter to the principle that "Courage
reflects justice when it... defends the weak and the oppressed."l25
Ambrose grounded this obligation in the premise that "Whoever does not
ward off a blow to a fellow man, when he can, is as much at fault as the
striker."l26 This flowed from Cicero's principles of justice: "Passive
(negative) justice is to do no harm; active (positive) justice is to do good.
Active injustice is to do harm to another; passive injustice is to neglect to
do good to another when you can."127 Further, Ambrose believed that
"failure to protect is the equivalent of murder."l28 These are all high
burdens, and while the subjective requirement seems harsh, that alone
demonstrates how modem warfare has greatly strayed from these
"inalienable moral obligation[s])."l 2 9 The application to PMSCs is
straightforward: the agents who wage war must do so for the weak and
oppressed, from a sense of moral responsibility, and from a moral
obligation to do good and not harm. The perceived inability of a PMSC
to accomplish this is not fatal unless one demonstrates first, that PMSCs
inherently pose an insurmountable barrier to right intention, and second,
that subjective right intention exists in all state actors who wage war.
Neither of those seems plausible.
One objection to right intention is the inherently financial motive of
PMSCs in waging war. However, given the existence of military careers
(many of which pay very well), it is unclear how this critique does not
also apply to state actors. It is also unclear that finances are necessarily
the motive of PMSC agents, especially within a hypothetical PMSC
solely engaging in humanitarian intervention, or PMSCs specializing in
123. My usage of right intention is identical to Simpson's, referring to the subjective side of
intentionality: "the motivational goal (finis) of the agent (operantis) who wages war." SIMPSON,
supra note 81, at 29. Right intention often combines the subjective with the objective, which
"involves the intention of the overall goal of a political-military action." Id. at 28. For the purposes
of this Article, the objective component is dealt with separately as the "end of peace" criterion,
infra.
124. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 29.
125. Id. at 40-41.
126. Ambrose, On the Duties of the Clergy, 1.28, 1.27, 1.36, as cited in SIMPSON, supra at
41, 104 n.2.
127. Cicero, On Duties, 1.7, 9 (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.constitution.org/rom/de
officiis.htm, construed in SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 41, 104 n.2.
128. Id at 41.
129. Id. at 54.
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the disruption of human trafficking. Martin Luther distinguished between
"acting in one's own self-interest and acting in the interest of a
neighbor";130 entering Rwanda to prevent the wholesale slaughter of
civilians, knowing the full extent of the danger, could very well be a
sacrificial, even heroic, act, regardless of financial compensation. Such
an intervention would meet Luther's conception of justice: "to help the
poor, the orphans and the widows to justice, and to further their cause."1 31
Indeed, the context of humanitarian intervention may dodge another
frequent criticism of PMSCs: the profiteering objection, which argues
that PMSCs profit from the destruction and death of others. 132 Though
technically true in a hypothetical Rwandan intervention, it is hardly a
comprehensive account or an adequate moral characterization. It should
be noted that the profiteering objection also applies to state actors,
particularly in the rise of defense suppliers and contractors in the last few
decades.
D. End of Peace
The end of peace is related to right intention. Whereas right intention
focused on the subjective intent of the actor, the end of peace focuses on
the objective "intention of the overall goal of a political-military
action."1 33
Ambrose asserted that "the pursuit of peace based on justice" is "the
only justification for waging war."134 Ending the Rwandan genocide
creates no problems here. It is possible, of course, that humanitarian
intervention is a mere pretext for geopolitical gain or other impermissible
purpose, which would violate this criterion. It has been suggested that this
criterion is the "preserve and responsibility of political leaders."1 35 If So,
and the PMSC has contracted with a state, then the end of peace criterion
poses no additional hurdles for PMSCs, since whether the actor is the
standing army or a PMSC, the sole consideration is the intention of the
political leadership. Even if the requirement included PMSC and/or NGO
leadership, it is at least plausible that this could be satisfied in a Rwanda
hypothetical.
130. Id.
131. Martin Luther, The Large Catechism, in THE CONFESSIONS OF THE EVANGELICAL
LUTHERAN CHURCH 13:53 (Robert Kolb & Timothy Wengert eds., 2000), as cited in SIMPSON,
supra note 81, at 83, 107 n.4.
132. Cecile Fabre, In Defence ofMercenarism, 40 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 539-59 (Apr. 21,2015),
http://www.mercenary-wars.net/pdf/ defence-of-mercenaries.pdf.
133. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 28.
134. Id. at 40-41.
135. James Pattison, Just War Theory and the Privatization ofMilitary Force, 22 ETHICS &
INT'L AFF. 143, 149 (2008) (citing BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 31-32 (2006)).
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The criterion of last resort requires the exhaustion of other reasonable
means of settlement, and must be pursued in good faith.13 6 The Rwanda
situation poses some interesting questions, largely because the
international community did so little. Can it be said that the United States,
for example, exhausted other reasonable means of settlement when it
refused to even label the slaughter a genocide?3 7 Perhaps the exigent
circumstances, specifically the daily slaughter of thousands, would
justify action despite U.S. failure to address the crisis at an earlier stage.
Regardless, it is plausible that genocide would be perpetrated despite
reasonable means of avoiding the atrocities by other states meeting the
last resort criterion. Another interesting question is raised as to whether
the PMSC must directly seek settlement, or whether the refusal to settle
with a state, NGO, or other private party is sufficient to satisfy last resort.
F Proportionality ofEnds
The proportionality of ends criterion mandates that the original injury
is not outweighed by the damage of waging war.1 8 One just war theorist
argued "humanitarian intervention should play a significant role in the
debate of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to depose Saddam Hussein,
whose regime was at least as bad as that of Idi Amin."l 39 Saddam Hussein
was a mass murderer and a brutal dictator, but it cannot be asserted that
the ends of the Iraq War outweighed the damages. In 2013, one study
found that the Iraqi death toll reached 500,000 since the 2003 invasion.14 0
This fails to account for the countless atrocities committed by ISIS since
then. In the first eight months of 2014 alone, ISIS injured or killed over
24,000 civilians, recruited 12-year-old soldiers, and forced women and
girls into sex slavery.141 It is difficult to see how intervening in Rwanda
would produce similarly disastrous consequences (though unintended
consequences was exactly the problem in Iraq), but careful considerations
of the costs and a profound appreciation for the horrors of war are
136. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 30.
137. See supra Part I.
138. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 30.
139. DAvIs BROWN, THE SWORD, THE CROSS, AND THE EAGLE: THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN
JUST WAR TRADITION 173 (2008).
140. Kerry Sheridan, Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Invasion, New Study Says,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 15, 2013, 09:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/15/iraq-
death-toll n_4102855.html.
141. Samuel Smith, UN Report on ISIS: 24,000 Killed, Injured by Islamic State; Children
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mandated.
G. Probability ofSuccess
The probability of success criterion requires a reasonable likelihood
that the purpose of war can be accomplished.142 This requirement forbids
utopian goals, and limits warfare to the realm of "realistic, and
sustainable peace." 4 3 In Rwanda, intervening parties would need to be
relatively secure in their ability to successfully mitigate or end the
slaughter.
H. Public Declaration
The final criterion is a public declaration for the reasoning and
necessity of waging war. The rationale for this criterion is to encourage
accountability from the international community, encouraging third
parties to determine the justifiability of the war, and expose
impermissible rationale, such as "war realism []or holy
war/crusade[s]."l44 Unfortunately, modern practice often violates this
requirement, diminishing crucial accountability and discourse in a
globally connected world. It is possible that PMSCs tempt political
leaders to forego public declarations for political reasons, since they can
more discreetly accomplish military objectives without expending
political capital. As discussed in Parts I and II, this can be a helpful
political tool in the context of humanitarian intervention. However, it can
also violate the public declaration criterion. While PMSCs could (and
often do) contribute to the erosion of this criterion, 145 it is not a logical
necessity, and it is plausible for leadership to both employ PMSCs and
comply with this requirement.
VI. INTEGRATING JUST WAR THEORY CRITERIA INTO PMSC
OPERATING GUIDELINES
PMSCs do not typically integrate jus ad bellum criteria into their
official operating guidelines, but many do reference jus in bello criteria.
Constellis Group is one example; the Code of Business Ethics and
Conduct contains a section on "Rules for the Use of Force," which
expressly implicates proportionality of means and impliedly references
142. SIMPSON, supra note 81, at 27.
143. Id. at 30.
144. Id at 31.
145. Pattison, supra note 134, at 154.
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the discrimination principle.14 6 Jus ad bellum, its criteria, and any
corporate decision-making process in determining where to utilize the use
of force are never mentioned, although the Code repeatedly urges
conformity with national and international law.
The Code claims compliance with the Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During
Armed Conflict, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers, and the ANSI/ASIS PSC/1 Management System for
Quality of Private Security Company Operations.14 7 The Montreux
Document, while detailed and an important affirmation of PMSC
accountability, does not explicitly reference jus ad bellum or criteria, or
place any responsibility on PMSCs to abide by them.14 8 The International
Code of Conduct (ICOC), however, does oblige signatory PMSCs to
refrain from contracting with an entity "in a manner that would be
contrary to United Nations Security Council sanctions."49 ICOC further
prohibits PMSCs from participation in or benefitting from "any national
or international crimes including but not limited to war crimes, crimes
against humanity, [and] genocide . . ."1so This seems to imply some sort
of highly permissive just cause criterion, and while obviously important,
it does not come close to encompassing jus ad bellum.
The fact that jus ad bellum criteria are frequently, if not typically,
omitted is highly problematic, and the inclusion of jus in bello criteria
within PMSC operating guidelines does little to morally alleviate the
omission. As McMahan has demonstrated, jus in bello "cannot-except
in rare instances-be satisfied in the absence of a just cause." Indeed,
they are "logically independent."5 - "[J]ust as a war that one is justified
in fighting may be fought in an unjust manner, so a war that is itself
unjustified may nevertheless be fought in ajust manner. . . 1 5 2 A just war
fought in an unjust manner renders the war unjust. Similarly, an unjust
war fought justly is not thereby transformed into a just war. Therefore,
jus in bello cannot logically exist absent jus ad bellum, yet such a fiction
persists within many PMSC protocols. Integration ofjus ad bellum norms
146. CONSTELLIS GROUP, CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICs AND CONDUCT 32 (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://docs.constellisgroup.com/GroupCode-ofConduct.pdf.
147. Id. at 10, 30-31.
148. See generally The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations
and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
During Armed Conflict (Sept. 17, 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002
0996.pdf.
149. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/ publications/briefing4_web-final.pdf.
150. Id.
151. McMahan, supra note 97, at 5-7.
152. Id at 5-6.
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into PMSC operating guidelines is therefore crucial for the moral,
political, and perhaps legall5 3 legitimacy of PMSC actors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The nature of warfare is changing, and PMSCs are a key feature of
21st century developments. While PMSCs pose significant issues, they
also possess important strengths that should not be glibly disregarded
when crafting policy to address widespread humanitarian violations. It is
plausible for PMSCs to satisfy just war theory criteria, as this Article has
demonstrated. It is also important for PMSCs to self-regulate and
implement these criteria. While many have integratedjus in bello criteria,
jus ad bellum is impermissibly absent from PMSC policies and operating
guidelines, and express integration of these criteria is crucial to bolster
the moral, political, and legal legitimacy of PMSC actors.
While the flaws of PMSCs are significant and deserve substantial
attention, their capacity to effectively stabilize humanitarian crises should
also be considered. Genocide plagued the 20th century, and the first years
of the 21st century indicate that widespread violations of human rights
are not declining. Crimes against humanity will continue, and
humanitarian intervention by a State may not be politically feasible, as
the case of Rwanda appallingly demonstrated. Political difficulties did
not make intervention any less necessary for the people of Rwanda. In
such a scenario, intervention by a PMSC is morally preferable to the
massacre of thousands, even assuming the violation of positive law.
While PMSCs generate controversy, they have reached international
prevalence, and like humanity, are capable of both good and evil.
Adoption of jus ad bellum criteria, and effective usage of PMSCs for
humanitarian intervention, edges PMSCs much closer to the former.
153. See supra Part IV.
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